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Chart 1. production and export of Russian gas
1. Production and export of Russian gas
The volume of natural gas production in Russia has remained relatively constant over the last de-
cade, with a small increase reported only in the last three years (see Chart 1). Since the currently 
operated deposits are largely becoming depleted and there are no major investments in new fields, 
gas production will probably remain at the same level or decrease in the coming years. 
Gas exports have likewise remained stable at approx. 180 bcm a year for the last several years 
(see Chart 1)1. However, Gazprom has announced that it plans to increase the volume of gas 
exports, especially to European countries with which it has signed long-term contracts. Therefo-
re, in order to meet the contractual obligations vis-à-vis its Western partners, the gas monopoly 
has to seek additional sources of gas in Central Asia. Gazprom aims to keep full control of gas 
exports from this region and to prevent Central Asian producers from selling their gas directly 
in European markets.
1  Source: Rosstat, Russian Statistical Yearbook 2002-2005.
Gas is exported exclusively by Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly (see Diagram 1). Gazprom sells 
Russian gas abroad in three principal ways:
– directly; 
– via its subsidiaries and joint-ventures with local businesses (such as Germany’s ZMB 
or Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus registered in Switzerland);
– via trading companies with no formal ownership links to Gazprom, registered in tax heavens 
(ITERA and EuralTransGas in the past, RosUkrEnergo at present).
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In the markets of buyer states, Russian gas is usually sold by companies with direct links 
to Gazprom, such as joint-ventures in which the Russian monopoly holds stakes (Gas Trading used 
to be an example of such a company in Poland; SlovRusGaz is a company of this kind in Slovakia 
and FRAgaz - in France). Alternatively, gas may also be sold by companies indirectly associated 
with the Russian monopoly, such as Vemex in the Czech Republic, a company owned by several 
companies with capital or personal links to Gazprom, or Hungary’s Emfesz which is connected 
with RosUkrEnergo (see Diagram 1).
Diagram 1. structure of Russian gas sales
Member States of the European Union are the most important consumers of Russian gas, buying 
approx. 60 percent of all gas exported from Russia, and the EU-15 accounts for approx. 70% of this 
volume. The two other important groups of buyers are the CIS countries (buying more than 27% 
of total exports) and the EU candidate countries in Southern Europe (13.5%)1 (see Chart 2). 
The largest buyer of Russian gas is Germany, followed by Ukraine and Italy. At present Russia ex-
ports gas neither to Eastern Asian countries nor to the United States. Due to existing infrastructure 
shortages (all main export pipelines run to Europe and there is no infrastructure for the transmis-
sion of liquefied gas (see Map 1)), a major portion of Russian gas will continue to be sold mainly 
to European countries in the coming years. 
1  2004 figures; source: Natural Gas Information 2005, IEA.
© osW/CEs
The main gas pipelines crossing Ukraine constitute the most important route for Russian gas ex-
ports, transmitting over 80% of all Russian gas sent beyond the CIS2 (see Chart 3). The export 
route splits in Ukrainian territory to form the western branch transmitting Russian gas via Slovakia 
to the EU, and the southern branch supplying the Balkan countries and Turkey (see Map 1). 
There are also two other gas export routes of lesser importance: Russia sends approx. 15% of its gas 
exports to Europe via the Yamal Europe pipeline, while the Blue Stream connecting Russia directly 
with Turkey accounts for just 3.2% of Russian gas exports3 (see Chart 3). 
2  2005 figures; proprietary calculations based on: Prime-Tass, Gazprom Annual Report 2005.
3  This refers to the export of gas beyond the CIS; 2005 figures; source: Prime-Tass and BOTAS of Turkey.
Chart 2. Major consumers of Russian gas
Chart 3. Russian gas: Export routes to Europe 
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Gas supplied by Gazprom accounts for approx. 23%4 of gas consumption in the European Union. 
European states show varying degrees of dependence on the import of gas from Russia (see Map 2). 
Countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe remain heavily dependent on gas imports 
from Russia and some of them, e.g. the Baltic States, rely on Russia for even 100% of their gas. 
Western European countries have much more diversified sources of gas supply, for example, Germa-
ny, the greatest gas importer in the EU, buys its gas also from Norway (approx. 30%) and from other 
EU Member States, while may other EU countries (e.g. Spain or the Netherlands) buy negligible 
amounts or do not buy at all from Russia (see Map 2).
4  Source: Natural Gas Information 2005, IEA.
Map 1. Russian gas: Export routes
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2. Gazprom’s foreign investments
Gazprom is Russia’s largest foreign investor. Its investments are mostly located in Europe, especially 
in the CIS and in countries of the former communist bloc, but increasingly also in Western Europe 
(see Map 3). Gazprom invests mainly in gas transport and export, but also, on a growing scale, 
in the gas distribution and retail sector:
– gas trade - Gazprom invests directly or indirectly (via daughter companies and joint ventures) 
in businesses selling Russian gas in all Central and Eastern European countries, the Baltic 
States, the Balkans and in the EU (Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland);
– gas transport and transit - especially in the important transit countries; although gas pipelines 
in Central Europe and the Balkans are operated by companies in which Gazprom holds minority 
stakes (or 50% stakes at the maximum), the Russian monopoly has a decisive say in those 
companies owing to certain provisions in their articles of incorporation or the “willing” attitude 
of local lobbies whose representatives sit on the companies’ management boards; 
– gas distribution in local markets - Gazprom is making efforts to expand its presence in local 
markets. In connection with the liberalization of gas markets in the EU and the gradual opening 
to competition, Gazprom has recently been increasingly interested to invest in this sector, espe-
cially in Western Europe (Germany, Italy, Great Britain);
– gas storage.
The Russian gas monopoly also invests in the production of gas extraction and transmission equip-
ment, processing, marketing and the technical services for gas undertakings, as well as the banking 
sector (see Map 3). 
Gazprom is also present in other continents, especially in the upstream segment (exploration 
and extraction) in Central Asia, India, Iran and other countries.
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3. Gazprom’s expansion plans
The principal objective of Russia’s gas expansion is to reinforce Gazprom’s position in Europe as 
the single most important gas exporter and a major investor. In order to achieve this objective, 
Russia has taken a number of measures in recent years, including in particular:
- plans to carry out new export projects in order to diversify gas exports routes to current custo-
mers and to enter new markets. These projects include:
a) the North European Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream), a route that will connect Russian gas 
fields (Yuzhno-Russkoye) with Germany via the Baltic Sea. The first branch of this pipeline, 
with a capacity of 27.5 bcm, is to be built by 2010, and the target capacity of 55 bcm is planned 
to be reached in 2012. The pipeline will cost an estimated 5–8  billion EUR. The project is to 
be carried out by Nord Stream, a company owned by Russia’s Gazprom (51%), Germany’s E.ON 
Ruhrgas (24.5%) and BASF Wintershall (24.5%). Most probably, Gasunie of the Netherlands will 
join in as another shareholder. The  North European Gas Pipeline will supply Russian gas to Ger-
many and to new markets in Northern Europe (including the United Kingdom). It will also reduce 
Russia’s dependence on the current transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus) – see Map 4;
b) the South European Gas Pipeline also known as Blue Stream II, a projected route that would 
supply Russian gas to Southern and Central Europe via the Black Sea and Turkey (once the 
capacity of the Blue Stream has been expanded). Russia’s Gazprom and Hungary’s MOL are 
willing to work together on this project. If it is implemented, Russia will gain a new gas export 
route (one that bypasses Ukraine) to its traditional Southern European markets and to Cen-
tral Europe. The project will also make it possible to limit or even prevent the export of gas 
to European markets from other sources, especially the Caspian region from which, according 
to original plans, gas was to be transported via Turkey (see Map 4);
- measures to step up control of transit routes for Russian energy resources in third countries (and 
in particular, to take over control of Ukraine’s main gas pipelines and of Beltransgas, the Bela-
rusian company that owns most of the country’s transit gas pipelines) – see Map 4;
- measures to limit the access of gas from other sources to European markets. To this end, 
Russia seeks to carry out the South European Gas Pipeline project (see above) and is ta-
king efforts to use the connector pipeline from Turkey to Greece and Italy (originally intended 
for the supply of gas from the Caspian region and, possibly, the Middle East, the objective being 
to diversify sources of supplies to Southern Europe) as another route transporting Russian gas 
to these markets. By gaining access to the Turkish transit gas pipelines, Russia could limit, or, 
in the extreme scenario, even stop exports of gas to Europe from non-Russian sources. This 
would reduce competition for Russian gas  in the European gas market; 
- expanding Russian presence in the downstream segment (retail and distribution) of the EU oil 
and gas market. For example, in late September 2006 a deal was signed that allows companies 
in which Gazprom is a shareholder (GWH and Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG) to sell gas in 
Austria’s retail market. Gazprom has also attempted to enter the German retail market (offering 
shares in the Yuzhno-Russkoye field to German companies in return) and to take over a stake 
in Britain’s Centrica;
- concluding strategic alliances with European energy companies (including E.ON Ruhrgas 
and MOL). 
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Map 4. gazprom’s expansion plans
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A possible formal or informal “gas alliance” with Algeria, the third largest exporter of gas to the EU 
after Russia and Norway, would be helpful in bringing about Russia’s expansion in the European gas 
sector. Measures indicating that the parties are working towards such rapprochement  have been 
observed for several months, for example, in August this year a memorandum was signed announ-
cing closer co-operation between Gazprom and Algeria’s Sontrach. A Russian-Algerian partnership 
would be able to control more than 50% of current gas imports to the EU and effectively prevent 
other gas producers from accessing the market, especially in Southern Europe. If such partnership 
were formalized, this would reduce the level of competition in the European gas market and might 
lead to an increase in gas prices.
Conclusions
1. As a result of Russia’s gas expansion in the EU:
- Russian gas would gain a stronger position in the markets of individual Member States and in the 
energy balance of the EU as a whole. In particular, in some EU Member States, the gas market 
would get to be dominated by supplies from Russia, competition would be restrained and freedom 
of access to these markets would shrink. In the Baltic States and Central Europe, this could reinforce 
their unilateral dependence on Russian gas and permanently tie the energy sectors of these countries 
to Russia. In Southern Europe, this might limit the possibilities of diversifying gas supplies, especial-
ly by preventing the supplies of Caspian gas to the EU; 
- Gazprom would gain more influence on the terms and conditions under which Russian gas is 
sold in Europe (gas prices, the question of re-export, terms and conditions of distribution in the 
Member States’ markets, etc.). This could lead to a spread of untransparent practices in the energy 
sector as the Russian monopoly uses gas trading companies with unclear ownership and  business 
and political affiliations.
2. It is in the interest of the European Union to develop partnership with Russia in the gas sector, 
but on specific terms and conditions that will ensure, inter alia:
- transparent terms of co-operation with a clear definition of the role of trading companies in mutual 
relations between the EU and Russia in the gas sphere; the presence of companies with concealed 
or untransparent ownership should be restricted in the EU;
- access of alternative gas producers to Europe’s gas market and transport networks. In particular, 
it is necessary to ensure an unrestrained possibility of gas transit from the Caspian region to the EU, 
both via Russia and Turkey (a transit corridor independent of Russia); 
- that no cartel of countries exporting gas to Europe or any other more or less formal agreement 
between gas exporters is established which might have an adverse effect on gas prices in Europe; 
in particular it is necessary to prevent a potential Russian-Algerian “gas alliance”.
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